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Abstract
This paper investigates the managers’ incentives to voluntarily comply with SOX 404b and the determinants of firms who
voluntarily disclose SOX 404b internal control over financial reporting assessment. We find that voluntary SOX 404b reporting
non-accelerated filers are more likely to receive effective internal control over financial reporting opinion than accelerated filers
and large accelerated filers. We find that voluntary SOX 404b reporting non-accelerated filers are more likely to hire Big Four as
independent auditors than non-SOX 404b reporting non-accelerated filers. We also predict and found substantially sufficient
cases where non-accelerated filers which used to be, or ex-post became accelerated filers or large accelerated filers, and nonaccelerated filers with parent companies complying with SOX 404b are motivated to voluntarily comply with SOX 404b.
Keywords: SOX 404, Voluntary Disclosure, Internal Control over Financial Reporting, Big Four.
1. Introduction
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was enacted in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals. One of the
most controversial provisions of SOX has been Section 404 regarding the management assessment of internal control over
financial reporting (ICFR). SOX Section 404 (a) requires the management of public companies to assess and report on the
effectiveness of the ICFR, and 404 (b) requires the external auditors to attest to and report on the adequacy of the
management’s assessment of ICFR. As the then SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said, the main purpose of Section 404 is to
“provide meaningful disclosure to investors about the effectiveness of a company’s internal controls systems, without creating
unnecessary compliance burdens or wasting shareholder resources”. Proponents praise the disclosure requirements, asserting that
Section 404 has improved the quality of financial reporting and restored public confidence (Pong, Nagy, & Cenker, 2007).
However, critics argue that the costs associated with Section 404 exceed the benefits derived and that Section 404 has created an
environment of “inefficient hyper-enforcement”(Grundfest & Bochner, 2006). They point out that SOX can "undesirably
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reduce management risk-taking incentives, distort corporate disclosure, impede the flow of internal information, and reduce
firms’ ability to attract qualified managers and directors” (Ribstein, 2002; Romano, 2004; Holmstrom & Kaplan, 2003). Some
empirical evidence suggests that the costs related to its compliance are remarkably high and impose a significant burden on
public companies (Raghunandan & Rama, 2006; Zhang, 2007), especially impacting disproportionally on non-accelerated filers
(companies with less than $75 million in public float) (Zhang, 2007; Iliev, 2010; Kinney & Shepardson, 2011).
The debate about compliance cost has led to concerns about extending the SOX compliance date and even a
permanent exemption for non-accelerated filers. Unlike accelerated filers (companies with more than $75 million but less than
$700 million in public float) and large accelerated filers (companies with more than $700 million in public float) who have to
comply with both Section 404 (a) and (b) for fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2004, non-accelerated filers must
comply with 404a from fiscal years ending after December 15, 2007. However, they were permanently exempted from Section
404(b) requirement.
Regarding the exemption for non-accelerated filers to comply with Section 404 (b), existing literature documents a
prevailing phenomenon that firms which are slightly around accelerated filer definition threshold reduced their market float or
retain their market float below the $75 million threshold to avoid heavy compliance costs with 404 (b) (Gao, Wu, &
Zimmerman, 2009; Nondorf, Singer, & You, 2012). However, to the best of our knowledge, few to none research have
investigated the opposite phenomenon: there are still some non-accelerated filers who voluntarily have their external auditors to
perform Section 404 (b) internal control audit, albeit its dramatically high compliance cost. Kinney and Shepardson (2011) find
that for small firms, rather than fully complying with SOX 404(b), management internal control reports and traditional
financial audits have been cost-effective. Traditional audits without internal control weakness reports could also generate
substantial weakness disclosure. Therefore, it seems counter-intuitive to comply with Section 404 (b) for non-accelerated filers.
We are interested in finding out the incentives for this voluntary disclosure behavior and general characteristics of
firms disclosing internal control effectiveness reports voluntarily. We try to find whether they are doing this to maintain
reputation, to correct misvalued stock price, to prepare for gaining or returning to the status of accelerated filers, or other
unidentified yet possible reasons.
Using the sample firms during the first eight years of SOX 404 compliance, find that voluntary SOX 404b reporting
non-accelerated filers are more likely to receive effective internal control over financial reporting opinion than accelerated filers
and large accelerated filers. We also find that voluntary SOX 404b reporting non-accelerated filers are more likely to hire Big
Four as independent auditors than non-SOX 404b reporting non-accelerated filers. We also predict and found substantially
sufficient cases where non-accelerated filers which used to be, or ex-post became accelerated filers or large accelerated filers, and
non-accelerated filers with parent companies complying with SOX 404b are motivated to voluntarily comply with SOX 404b.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it adds to the disclosure literature by examining the
benefits of voluntary disclosure and the incentives of managers to voluntarily comply with costly SOX 404b. Second, it adds to
the SOX 404 literature by providing evidence whether SOX 404 meets its desired purpose and whether it incurs undesired
consequences.
2. Regulatory Background and Literature Review

2.1 Regulatory Background

The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was passed in 2002 after a series of high profile corporate scandals. The law’s main
goal was to improve the quality of financial reporting and to increase investor confidence. In 2003, the SEC implemented
Section 404 of SOX, which requires the management of public companies to assess and report on the effectiveness of the ICFR,
and external auditors need to attest to and report on the adequacy of the management’s assessment of ICFR. According to the
SEC, Section 404 procedures are intended to help companies detect fraudulent reporting early and thus to deter financial fraud,
directly improving the reliability of financial statements (SEC release 33-8238). The first SEC proposal requires all listed firms
to comply with section 404 for fiscal years ending on or after September 15, 2003. However, due to adverse comments, the SEC
deferred the accelerated filers’ SOX 404 compliance to fiscal years ending on or after June 15, 2004, and non-accelerated filers’
compliance to fiscal years ending on or after April 15, 2005 (Securities, 2004).The deadline kept being pushed forward, and the
SEC finally requires that accelerate filers and large accelerated filers must comply with both Section 404a and 404b for fiscal
years ending on or after November 15, 2004, and non-accelerated filers are not required by the SEC to comply with 404auntil
fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2007. But for non-accelerated filers to comply with SOX 404b, they were
continually given an extension by the SEC until September 15, 2010, when President Obama signed into the “Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act”-that permanently exempted non-accelerated filers from Section 404b requirement.

2.2 Benefit of Voluntary Disclosure

Voluntary disclosure is the dissemination of company information not mandated by disclosure regulations to the public or the
investors. The theoretical literature argues that the managers disclose their private information to mitigate the adverse selection
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problem in the capital markets by reducing information asymmetry between the firm and investors, thus enabling greater
liquidity and lowering transaction costs or non-diversifiable estimation risk (Verrecchia, 1983; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991;
Coles, Loewenstein, & Suay, 1995; Lang & Lundholm, 2000; Francis, Khurana, & Pereira, 2005; Jones, 2007; Shroff, Sun,
White, & Zhang, 2013; Schoenfeld, 2017). Prior empirical research papers also find that there is a relation between the level of
disclosure and bid-ask spreads, information risk, litigation risk, and cost of capital (Welker, 1995; Botosan, 1997; Botosan &
Plumlee, 2002; Cao & Narayanamoorthy, 2011; Hanley & Hoberg, 2012; Houston, Lin, Liu, & Wei, 2019). However, Cheynel
(2013) finds that for disclosing and non-disclosing firms the relationship between voluntary disclosure and cost of capital is
positive in aggregate. Similarly, Bertomeu, Beyer, and Dye (2011) develop a model of capital structure and suggest that cost of
capital may not decrease due to more expansive voluntary disclosure. Additionally, Kim and Shi (2011) indicate the tone of
voluntary disclosure tends to influence the effect of voluntary disclosure on the cost of capital and bad news forecast will
increase the cost of equity capital while good news forecast doesn't significantly change the cost of capital. Finally, Francis,
Nanda, and Olsson (2008) conclude that earnings quality instead of voluntary disclosure has the first-order effect on the lower
level of cost of capital.

2.3 Determinants of Firms with Voluntary Disclosure of Internal Control

Three prior types of research relate most closely to our research question on the determinants of firms that voluntarily disclose
their report on internal control. McMullen, Raghunandan, and Rama (1996) find that smaller firms that were subject to SEC
enforcement actions or incurred financial restatements are less likely to provide voluntary disclosure on internal control.
Bronson, Carcello, and Raghunandan (2006) use 397 midsized firms in 1998 as sample firms and find that the voluntary
internal control disclosure firms generally are larger, have more meetings in the audit committee, are higher in the level of
institutional ownership, and grow more rapidly in sales. Basu, Krishnan, Lee, and Zhang (2018) find that even being exempted
from SOX 404b requirements at the time of IPO; many firms still proactively disclose material internal control weakness before
going public. These firms generally have higher litigation risk, hire auditors that are industry specialists, and are more likely to
have an audit committee before IPO.
3. Hypotheses Development
SOX 404b is reported to be the most costly provision by both practitioners and researchers. While accelerated filers and large
accelerated filers (hereafter referred to as AFLAF) have no choice but to comply with SOX 404b, there are two options for nonaccelerated filers (hereafter referred to as NAF) to choose: comply or not. If the firm chooses to comply with 404b, it has to
incur large cost in compliance during the first year due to the demand for increasing process and control documentation for
high-risk processes. Firms, by nature, exist to make a profit. If compliance with 404b does not generate future benefits to the
firm, the firm would not choose to comply. That is to say, if the firm let the independent auditor attest to the management
report on ICFR, and get a negative opinion, the market would have a negative reaction to its stock price. In this way, the firm
incurs double loss – compliance cost and market price decrease. Therefore, for any rational firm, if it anticipates negative
opinion on SOX 404b, they would otherwise choose not to comply with it. On the other hand, if the firm has confidence in its
ICFR, and expects positive opinion on SOX 404b, it would be more willing to comply with it because it is giving the market a
signal that they have high-quality ICFR. Therefore, our first hypothesis is:
H1: Firms voluntarily complying with SOX 404b are more likely to receive positive ICFR opinions.
Big-N auditors are identified in the literature as higher quality auditors as they have the technological capability in
detecting earnings management, and when detected, there is a higher probability that they will report it. Many studies (Dopunch
& Simunic, 1982; DeAngelo, 1981) have postulated product differentiation in the audit market, specifically, that large audit
firms (the Big Eight) provide higher quality audit services than those provided by smaller audit firms. Non-accelerated filers who
voluntarily comply with SOX 404b normally want to show their high quality of internal control, so they are likely to choose
Big-4 to confirm their high quality. Therefore, our second hypothesis is:
H2: Firms voluntarily complying with SOX 404b are more likely to use Big-4 as independent auditors.
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) argue that much of the compliance costs of SOX are fixed. Since the firm would have
already incurred the major portion of costs in the first year of compliance, the compliance costs in subsequent years are unlikely
to be significant. Thus, if a firm has already complied with SOX 404b when it was a large accelerated filer or accelerated filer,
and changed to the non-accelerated filer, it would be willing to comply with SOX 404b for some reasons. First, with little
incremental compliance cost, it would benefit from voluntary disclosure on ICFR from the capital market. Second, if the firm
anticipates that it would return to the accelerated filer or large accelerated filers in the future, the continued compliance with
SOX 404b is a good signal to the market.
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On the other hand, if a firm prepares to expand and anticipates to become an accelerated filer or large accelerated filer in
the next year or later, they might also be willing to comply with SOX 404b when they are not supposed to because voluntary
disclosure brings about the aforesaid benefits while mandatory disclosure does not. Therefore, our third hypothesis is:
H3a: Formerly accelerated filers and large accelerated filers are motivated to voluntarily comply with SOX 404b when
they become non-accelerated filers.
H3b: Non-accelerated filers who anticipate becoming accelerated filers or large accelerated filers are more motivated to
voluntarily comply with SOX 404b.
Many firms that have subsidiary firms file combined 10-K form to the SEC. Among all the subsidiary firms, several of
them might also be listed companies. When the parent company performs SOX 404b auditing, the subsidiary firms have to also
go through the whole process of SOX 404b auditing “passively”. They had no other choice but to incur the compliance cost, so
it is to their best benefit to also issue SOX 404b report “voluntarily”. Although it seems to be voluntary compliance, the fact is
that they take a ride from the parent company and enjoy the benefit of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, our fourth hypothesis is:
H4: Firms with parent companies that are accelerated filers or large accelerated filers are motivated to voluntarily
comply with SOX 404b.
4. Sample, Model, and Variables

4.1 Sample

The sample firms we examine in this study are listed domestic companies in the United States from 2003 to 2012. Auditing
related information and firm filer status are collected from Audit Analytics, and firm financial information is collected from
COMPUSTAT.

4.2 Model

For Hypothesis 1, we use the following logistic regression model:
Pr(MW=0) =γ0 +γ1 *VD+γ2 *LNTA +γ3 *LOSS +γ(Industry Controls) +μ
For Hypothesis 2, we regress the probability of voluntary SOX 404b compliance on firm characteristics and control variables,
using the following logit regression:
Pr(VD=1) = β1 + β2 × BIG4 + β 2 *LNTA + β 3 *LOSS β(Industry Controls) + ε
Where:
MW = 1 if the firm has material weakness in IFRC;
VD = 1 if the firm voluntarily complies with 404b, else 0;
BIG4 = 1 if the firm uses Big 4 auditor, else 0;
LOSS = 1 if negative earnings, else 1;
LNTA = natural log of total assets at year-end;
For Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4, descriptive statistics would suffice as we only need documented phenomenon to support
these two hypotheses.
5. Empirical Findings
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of firms filing SOX 404a and 404b during the first 8 SOX compliance year, with the
first compliance year being fiscal year-ends that fall in the range of November 15, 2004, to November 14, 2005. The results
show that from year 1 to year 3 because 404a is mandatory only for AFLAF, the number of 404a reports remains low at around
4000, and from year 4 on, the 404a reports suddenly go up to double the number in year 3, because NAF is mandated to
provide 404a reports from year 4 on. For 404b reports, the number goes up from 3697 to 3906 from year 1 to year 3, but
drops gradually to 3345 from year 4 to year 8, which arguably could be because the financial crisis caused many firms either go
private or downsized to NAF, who does not have the responsibility to provide 404b reports.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of firms filing SOX 404a and 404b
SOX Year

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

404a

3711

3847

4006

8096

8068

7675

7363

7045

404b

3697

3788

3855

3906

3749

3599

3352

3345

Note: The first SOX year is fiscal year-ends that fall in the range of November 15, 2004, to November 14, 2005.
Table 2 presents the basic statistics for effective internal control over financial reporting opinions. Panel A presents
the descriptive statistics of internal control effectiveness, and the percentage comparison of not-effective firms is presented in
Panel B and Figure 1. The results show that, in the first three years of SOX 404b compliance, voluntary NAF have a statistically
lower percentage of obtaining "non-effective ICFR" opinion than AFLAF, with the percentage being 6.45% vs. 18.19% in year
1, 10.13% vs. 12.92% in year 2, and 7.89% vs. 10.38% in year 3. This partially supports our hypothesis 1. However, during
the later years, there is no clear pattern of whether NAF gets more percentage of effective ICFR opinion than the AFLAF or the
other way around. It might not necessarily go against our hypothesis, because it might not be because more "bad" NAFs are
voluntarily complying with SOX 404b, but because more AFLAF have modified their weakness in ICFR and the relative
percentage difference becomes smaller. Figure 1 presents this view: the "not effective opinion" rate is plunging for AFLAF from
18.19% in year 1 to 4.40% in year 5 and remains around 4% during year 6 to year 8. However, this pattern does not apply for
NAF. This result is also consistent with the notion of "diseconomies of scale", which contends that larger firms have more
financial resources and better infrastructure to mitigate the weakness of internal control over financial reporting over time.
Table 2. Basic Statistics for Effective ICFR Opinions

Panel A: Descriptive statistics of internal control effectiveness
SOX Year

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

No

4

8

6

10

9

6

7

10

Yes

58

71

70

110

140

271

179

123

Total

62

79

76

120

149

277

186

133

No

495

354

291

225

115

80

72

93

Yes

2226

2385

2512

2572

2501

2320

2250

2264

Total

2721

2739

2803

2797

2616

2400

2322

2357

Grand total

2783

2818

2879

2917

2765

2677

2508

2490

NAF

AFLAF

Panel B: Comparison of percentage of not effective firms
SOX Year

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

NAF No (%)

6.45

10.13

7.89

8.33

6.04

2.17

3.76

7.52

Large No (%)

18.19

12.92

10.38

8.04

4.40

3.33

3.10

3.95

Note: NAF refers to “non-accelerated filers”, and AFLAF refers to “accelerated filers and large accelerated filers”.
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20.00%
18.00%
16.00%
14.00%
12.00%
10.00%

NAF no %

8.00%

Large no %

6.00%
4.00%
2.00%
0.00%
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Figure 1. Comparison of percentage of not effective firms
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of types of voluntary compliance firms. The column “Momentum” provides
support to our Hypothesis 3, which predicts that NAFs that used to be AFs or LAFs or ex-post become AFs or LAFs are
motivated to voluntarily comply with 404b. From year 1 to year 6, the number of these NAF increased from 13 to 180, and this
could be due to two reasons. First, as the SOX years go on, the more valuable practice of mitigating internal control weakness
has been developed by larger firms, so NAF that anticipate becoming AFLAF are more willing to comply with 404b with more
guidance and less unnecessary costs. Second, years 4, 5, and 6 are the years of the financial crisis, so more AFLAF downsized to
NAF but they still comply with 404b because it incurs little to none marginal costs for them. However, in year 7 and year 8 the
number of momentum firms jumped to 108 and 52, which may be due to the comeback of economy pulling those used-to-beAFLAF NAFs back to AFLAF status again. The "Parent" column in Table 3 provides support for Hypothesis 4. There are 24
to 39 NAF during the 8 SOX years who have their parent company as AFLAF and include their financial statements in the
AFLAF's 10-K annual report. As the parent companies must comply with 404b, the NAF are subject to 404b in a compulsory
manner. Therefore they passively complied with 404b. The "Pure Voluntary" column provides preliminary evidence to support
our Hypothesis 1. The pure voluntary disclosure NAF almost all get effective internal control over financial reporting opinion,
except for the 8th year. These firms remain the status of NAF and they seem to be excellent NAF among others in terms of
effective internal control over financial reporting, so they are confident to provide the 404b reports.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of types of voluntary compliance firms
SOX year

Momentum

Parent

Pure Voluntary
Total
(Not effective ICFR)
1
13
24
25 (2)
62
2
29
24
26 (2)
79
3
26
26
24 (0)
76
4
65
29
26 (1)
120
5
93
31
25 (2)
149
6
180
39
58 (0)
277
7
108
29
49 (2)
186
8
52
29
52 (10)
133
Note: "Parent" means the firm has a parent company which is a large accelerated filer; "Momentum" means the following
three circumstances: 1) the firm used to be an accelerated filer and then becomes non-accelerated filer, and then returns to
the status of the accelerated filer, and it voluntarily complies with SOX 404b at least once during its non-accelerated filer
status; 2) the firm voluntarily complies with SOX 404b before it becomes accelerated filer; 3) the firm used to be
accelerated filer and also complied with SOX 404b at least for one year; “Pure Voluntary” means the firm does not qualify
for any aforementioned types of voluntary compliance.
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Table 4 Panel A presents descriptive statistics of firms' independent auditor choice, and the comparison is
presented in Panel B and Figure 2. The results show that during the 8 SOX compliance years, 78.20% to 91.94% of the
voluntary NAFs employ the Big Four accounting firms as their independent auditors, but in contrast, only 18.09% to 44.05%
or the non-voluntary NAFs hire Big Fours. It is very clear that voluntary SOX 404b reporting NAFs are significantly more
likely to use Big Four as independent auditors than non-voluntary SOX 404b reporting NAF. This supports our hypothesis 4,
and we will also revisit this hypothesis using multivariate regression.
Table 4. Basic Statistics of NAFs’ Auditor Choice

Panel A: Descriptive statistics of NAFs’ independent auditor choice
SOX Year
Voluntary
Big 4
Non-Big 4
Total
Non-voluntary
Big 4
Non-Big 4
Total
Grand total

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

57
5
62

67
12
79

68
8
76

94
26
120

120
29
149

225
52
277

146
40
186

104
29
133

1305
2372
3677
3739

976
1445
2421
2500

766
973
1739
1815

649
1448
2097
2217

594
2651
3245
3394

500
2543
3043
3320

541
2449
2990
3176

522
2296
2818
2951

6

7

8

Panel B: Comparison of NAFs’ percentage of choosing Big Four as auditors
SOX Year

1

2

3

4

5

Voluntary
91.94% 84.81%
89.47% 78.33% 80.54% 81.23% 78.49% 78.20%
Non-voluntary
35.49% 40.31%
44.05% 30.95% 18.31% 16.43% 18.09% 18.52%
Note: “Big 4” refers to the international Big 4 accounting firms, and “Non-Big 4” refers to the other accounting firms.
100.00%
90.00%
80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%

NAF Big4 %

40.00%

Large Big4 %

30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Figure 2. Comparison of firms’ percentage of choosing Big Four as auditors
Table 5 presents the empirical result from the first regression model which tests whether voluntary NAF receives a
lower percentage of ineffective internal control over financial reporting opinions. As we can see from the result, VD's coefficient
is positive (coefficient = 0.5533) and significant at a 1% level, which means that if firms voluntarily comply with 404b, the
7
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probability of getting effective internal control opinion is higher. Therefore, we can conclude that the data in the univariate test
and multivariate test both support our Hypothesis 1.
Table 5. Empirical results for Hypothesis 1 with the regression
Pr(MW=0) =γ0 +γ1 *VD+γ2 *LNTA +γ3 *LOSS +γ(Industry Controls) +μ
Parameter
Estimate
P-value
Intercept
-5.6877
0.979
VD
0.5533
0.0021
LNTA
0.2136
<.0001
LOSS
-0.7448
<.0001
Industry
Yes
Effect
No. of
16037
Observations
R2
0.0237
Note: This table presents regression of the probability of no material weakness (MW=0) on whether the
firm voluntarily complies with SOX 404b (VD). Coefficients and P values are provided in the table.
Table 6 presents the empirical result from the second regression model which tests whether voluntary NAFs are
more likely to hire Big Fours as their independent auditors. As we can see from the results, the coefficient of Big4 (coefficient =
0.7443) is positive and significant at 1% level, indicating that the likelihood of NAFs hiring Big Fours is significantly higher
than the non-voluntary NAF. Therefore, we can conclude that the univariate test and the multivariate test both support our
Hypothesis 4.
Table 6. Empirical results for Hypothesis 4 with the regression
Pr(VD=1) = β1 + β2 × BIG4 + β 2 *LNTA + β 3 *LOSS β(Industry Controls) + ε
Parameter
Estimate
P-value
Intercept
-13.3632
0.9496
Big4
0.7443
<.0001
LNTA
0.4184
<.0001
loss
0.3183
0.0012
Industry Effect
Yes
No. of Observations
9835
R2
0.1065
Note: This table presents regression of the probability of voluntary compliance with SOX 404b (VD) on
whether the firm hires Big Four accounting firms (Big4) as the independent auditor. Both of the variables
are indicatory variables, where they take 1 if that happens, and 0 otherwise. Coefficients and P values are
provided in the table.
Taken together, the descriptive statistics and the empirical test results support our four hypotheses. Nonaccelerated filers that used to be, or ex-post became accelerated filers or large accelerated filers, and non-accelerated filers with
parent companies complying with SOX 404b are motivated to voluntarily comply with SOX 404b. Voluntary SOX 404b
reporting non-accelerated filers are more likely to receive effective internal control over financial reporting opinion and more
likely to hire Big Four as independent auditors than accelerated filers and large accelerated filers.
6. Conclusion and Future Research
This paper investigates the managers' incentives to voluntarily comply with SOX 404b and the determinants of firms who
voluntarily disclose SOX 404b ICFR assessment. Using the first eight years of SOX 404 compliance data, we find that
voluntary SOX 404b reporting non-accelerated filers are more likely to receive effective internal control over financial reporting
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opinion than accelerated filers and large accelerated filers. We find that voluntary SOX 404b reporting non-accelerated filers are
more likely to hire Big Four as independent auditors than non-SOX 404b reporting non-accelerated filers. We predict and
found many cases confirming that firms that used to be, or ex-post became accelerated filers or large accelerated filers, and firms
with parent company complying with SOX 404b are motivated to voluntarily comply with SOX 404b. Future research could
study the voluntary compliance issue for foreign firms listed in the U.S. to check whether the behavior of 20-F issuers is
different from 10-K issuers.
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